T he vast majority of cooperating individuals are related to each other, as expected under kin selection 1 . This makes those exceptional cases where cooperators are unrelated particularly interesting, because these groups should confer direct benefits, or a probability of direct benefits, on all their members, a condition which should have a great impact on the nature of their cooperation. Unrelated group members have been reported in kingfishers 2 , manakins 3 , mongooses 4 , halictine bees 5 and ant foundresses 6, 7 .
Here, we review the case of associations of unrelated ant queens during colony founding. Ant queens might begin nests with non-relatives because mass mating flights can make it impossible to locate relatives 8 . Where genetic relatedness has been measured directly, foundresses have been found to be unrelated (e.g. in Messor pergandei 6 , Acromyrmex versicolor 6 and Polyrhachis moesta 7 ). Even though they are unrelated, the foundresses must participate in costly tasks if they are to gain the cooperative benefits possible with grouping 9 , and these benefits must potentially apply to any one of the cofoundresses 10, 11 .
Ant species with foundress associations share ecological characteristics rather than phylogenetic history. Cooperation occurs in three ant subfamilies, the Myrmicinae (e.g. Solenopsis, Messor and Acromyrmex spp.), the Dolichoderinae (Azteca and Iridomyrmex spp.) and the Formicinae (Myrmecocystus, Lasius, Camponotus, Formica and Oecophylla spp.) 8, 12 . Species with cooperative associations are territorial, and workers from mature colonies not only attack foragers but can completely destroy new nests (Table 1) . Newly founded nests (Fig. 1a) also compete among themselves, with their first workers often stealing brood from neighboring nests (Fig. 1c) . Colonies begun by more than one foundress produce more workers, and are more successful than solitary foundresses at defending themselves against other colonies (Table 2 ). This density-dependent competition among colonies might even be the main force promoting foundress associations 8, 13 .
However, these associations are unstable because the advantage of having multiple foundresses ends with the emergence of adult workers 14, 15 . Queens in cooperative associations do not forage (the known exception is Cooperation among unrelated individuals: the ant foundress case Giorgina Bernasconi and Joan E. Strassmann Ant foundress associations are an example of cooperation among non-kin. Across a dozen genera, queens able to found a colony alone often join unrelated queens, thereby enhancing worker production and colony survivorship. The benefits of joining other queens vary with group size and ecological conditions. However, after the first workers mature, the queens fight until only one survives. The presence of cofoundresses, and their relative fighting ability, also affects the extent of cooperative investment before worker emergence. This reveals previously overlooked early conflicts among queens, which reduce the mutualistic benefits of cooperation.
A. versicolor 13 ). Instead, they seal themselves in a nest burrow to produce their first workers from their body reserves -fat, proteins, and glycogen obtained by digesting the wing muscles (Fig. 1b) 16 . These reserves are used to feed the developing workers, either by regurgitation or with trophic eggs (non-viable eggs produced specifically to feed the brood) 16, 17 . When workers emerge, they forage, which ends the stage when brood production is directly dependent on the body reserves of the queens. When this stage is reached, each queen no longer needs the others and can obtain an enormous fitness advantage if she can monopolize reproduction 10, 13 . At this point 15 , queens fight to the death in most species (Fig. 1d) , whereas aggression is rarely observed before this time 8, 18 . Losers have zero fitness, thus when queens initially join the group they put their lives at risk, gambling that they will be the one to survive 11 . These ant foundress associations provide a simple system for investigating the ecological and behavioral factors that can promote cooperation in the absence of both relatedness and indirect fitness. In the past 16 years, the fire ant Solenopsis invicta 9, [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] has provided a particularly good model for the dynamics of cooperation and competition among unrelated foundresses.
Natural group sizes of ant foundress associations
Foundress groups form when the queens drop to the ground after their mating flight, but before completely sealing themselves away in a newly dug nest (Figs 1a and  b) . Group formation might occur by chance encounters, or by active searches for other queens or for already excavated nests.
In S. invicta and Me. pergandei, the natural distribution of group sizes has been shown to depart significantly from random (truncated Poisson distribution with no empty nests; Table 1 ), whereas in other species no significant departure was observed (possibly because of low statistical power). Nonrandom distribution of group sizes, in itself, does not demonstrate that group formation results from the queens' active choice, because it might also arise through spatial patchiness of suitable nest sites 19 . Spatial patchiness should be taken into account in field surveys. For instance, suitable nest sites are limited by temperature for A. versicolor, soil moisture for Me. pergandei and the occasional occurrence of floods for S. invicta 8, 13, 19 . On the other hand, specific habitat requirements, resulting in nest clumping, can affect the intensity of competition among colonies and thus influence queen behavior during group formation. A field experiment demonstrated that S. invicta queens form larger than expected groups under random encounters, in areas where higher densities of queens were released 19 . Larger groups form under high density, probably as an adaptive response to the expected intensity of competition. In areas of dense settlement, brood raiding ( Fig. 1c) is more intense 22 , and larger groups have a greater probability of winning raids ( Table 2) . Clumping of queens and nests also occurs in Myrmecocystus mimicus (Table 2) . Brood raiding and other pressures, for instance from mature colonies that destroy new nests, can act at the same time and influence optimal group size ( Table 1) . For instance, in S. invicta queen survival among group queens compared with solitary queens, was higher in two-but not in four-queen colonies when exposed to mature colonies 27 ( Table 2) , and in four-but not in two-queen colonies in experiments that simultaneously accounted for brood raiding and queen relocation (see next section) 22 . This suggests that optimal group size depends on several factors, and that groups might need to reach a certain minimum size before advantages accrue.
In S. invicta, queens cooperate in nest excavation and regularly return to the surface. Group size is only fixed after the nest entrance is closed 19 . In a field survey of My. mimicus, the average group size doubled between the end of the mating flight (mean ϭ 1.6) and later the same day (mean ϭ 2.9; Table 1 ), suggesting that, in this species, some queens join nests that are already being excavated. Before the entrances close, there might be conflict between residents and intruders because some group sizes provide greater benefits than others 11 (Table 2) .
Benefits of cooperation: increased colony survival
The main benefit of cooperation -higher success at brood raiding after entrances are opened by foraging workers (Fig. 1c, Table 2 ) -is directly attributable to the presence of extra queens. This is because the queens draw on their limited body reserves to produce the workers 16 ; multiple queens that contribute to egg-laying 15,28 produce more workers [13] [14] [15] and, in some cases, produce them earlier 14, 15 . The number of first workers directly determines colony success at brood raiding, as shown in an experiment in which adding workers to one-queen colonies shortly before brood raiding increases their success 29 . 19 . Multiple-queen Multiple-queen colonies are more successful at brood raiding. colonies produce more workers than solitary foundresses (L) 19 .
Increasing the number of workers enhances the probability Colonies founded by ten-queen associations produce sexuals of winning a raid (F) 22, 42 . Three-queen colonies survive worker 60% earlier than colonies started by one queen, in spite of no attacks better than lone queens (L). Two-but not four-queen significant difference in colony size at maturity (L) 43 .
colonies have higher per-queen survival up to worker emergence (F) 27 . Usurping queens are less successful when entering a three-queen than a one-queen colony, independently of the number of workers present (L) 26 .
Myrmecocystus
Queens cooperate at nest excavation (F) 37 . Multiple-queen Multiple-queen colonies are more successful at brood mimicus colonies produce more workers than solitary queens 37 . raiding than solitary queens (L) 37 . Lasius niger Two-queen colonies produce more workers in less time than Two-queen colonies are more successful at brood raiding solitary foundresses (L) 15 .
than solitary queens (L) 15 .
Messor pergandei
Queens all contribute to nest excavation (with queens differing Multiple-queen colonies are more successful at brood in their contribution in some nests), to oviposition (no raiding than solitary queens (L) 14 . Increasing the number significant differences), and to egg tending (with significant of workers enhances the probability of winning a raid (L 29 , but differences among queens, L) 28 .
see F 39 ). Colonies started by multiple queens open nine days earlier than colonies started by solitary queens (L) 14 . Oecophylla
Multiple queens cooperate to build a nest when there are silk--smaragdina producing larvae and they shelter the brood beforehand (F) 30 .
a F, field study; L, laboratory study.
Brood raiding can eliminate Ͼ90% of the nests long before any one colony produces sexual progeny 20 . Benefits of cooperation in the face of brood raiding have been documented for S. invicta, My. mimicus, Lasius niger and Me. pergandei (Table 2) . Cooperative colony founding can also increase the odds of successful defense against usurpation. Queens who have lost all of their brood because of raiding might try to usurp neighboring colonies 20 . In laboratory experiments on fire ants, three-queen associations were able to resist usurpation more successfully than solitary foundresses 26 . Additional benefits to group nesting occur in species requiring symbionts that might not be carried by all newly mated queens (fungus-growing ants 8 ), or in those with complex nest architecture. The arboreal ant Oecophylla smaragdina builds nests by weaving leaves with the silk produced by larvae: multiple queens can cooperate to position leaves but solitary queens can only weave leaves that already overlap 30 (Table 2) .
Who should queens join?
If queens can choose, they should always join a queen they can beat in the eventual fight for sole control of the colony 31 . Because queens vary in fighting ability 9, 18, [23] [24] [25] 32 , poor competitors should only join an association if their odds of success as a solitary foundress are even more dismal 9 . A model that incorporates survival chances (while searching for nest sites) and variable benefits of cofounding ( Table 2) , predicts that ant queens should join any nest if the odds that they will die before joining a nest are high, but that otherwise they should discriminate by competitive ability 31 . Kinship is not a factor because the chance of encountering relatives is so low. In laboratory experiments with Lasius pallitarsis (Table 1) , the joining decision depends on the phenotype of potential cofoundresses, which supports the model's prediction that variance in competitive ability might favor conditional joining behavior. It is in the best interests of individual queens to sort into groups by competitive ability, such as size 9 or body mass 23, 24 , where they cannot tell who will win. In S. invicta, initially heavier queens are more likely to survive fights after worker emergence in two-queen colonies 23, 24 . Aggressive interactions before worker emergence might also be less common in associations with queens of equal or similar competitive ability, because evenly matched competitors will not challenge each other as readily 18 . Though we know the impact of joining similar-and different-sized queens, we do not yet know whether queens favor like-sized individuals in the field. Whether the costs of rejecting a possible nest, or nestmate, are too great for such discrimination should be resolved with future studies.
Competition among foundresses in the same group
As foundresses are unrelated, they are expected to compete. Once in a group, cofoundresses might face a trade-off. Increased individual investment in laying eggs, which serve both as new workers and as food for the workers during their larval stage, enhances worker production, colony survival and growth. However, increased investment might be costly to the individual queen, reducing her probability of surviving fights if her condition, when fighting occurs, is directly associated with fighting ability 33 . Other costs might arise, for example, if the workers preferentially feed the queen in better condition (which might increase her survival) or if increased early egg laying decreases the later fecundity of the surviving queen 9 .
For several species, there is evidence that queens produce fewer per capita first worker-brood when initiating colonies with cofoundresses than when alone 9, 15, 21, 34, 35 (Table 3) . It follows that S. invicta queens within associations lose less mass before worker emergence than solitary queens 9, 21 . An experiment, in which per capita brood number and the presence of a nestmate queen were manipulated independently of each other, demonstrated that lower mass loss is a response to the presence of nestmates and not to different brood care demands 9 . Lower individual mass loss probably reflects competition among the queens 21 , solitary queens Early queen mortality is higher in fourinvicta productivity with group size do not (L) 17 . Differential mass loss of initially equally than in one-queen colonies, and in four-(F) 21 . Queens given a heavy cofoundresses (L) 23 is predicted by size queen colonies increases with queen nestmate lose less mass difference, which in turn predicts fighting ability (L) 9 . initial mass (L) 18 . This is not consistent than solitary queens,
The most likely survivor has lost less mass and has with queens dying of starvation, but rather independently of brood size more workers (L) 25 (but see L 24 ). with phenotype-dependent early (n = 86, L) 9 .
aggression (L) 18 . Myrmecocystus Optimum curve of colony Queens in associations eat eggs (L) 37 . Early queen mortality occurs and has a mimicus productivity with group size minimum at the population-average group (L) 37 .
size (L) 37 . Lasius spp.
Optimum curve of colony Queens of initially same mass differ significantly Early queen mortality is higher in L. productivity with group size after 25 days; egg laying is not equally distributed in pallitarsis non-kin queen pairs than for (L) 15 .
12 out of 15 two-queen L. niger colonies (L) 15 . solitary queens (L) 32 . Messor spp.
Optimum curve of colony In Me. pergandei, no significant differences among In Me. pergandei, mortality occurs before productivity with group size queens in egg laying, but significant differences in worker emergence (L) 14 , e.g. in 84% of in Me. aciculatum (L) 35 .
egg tending (L) 14, 28 . experimental multiple-queen colonies (F) 39 . Camponotus Not recorded Queens stand over their own eggs and displace each Aggressive behavior observed (L) 44 . ferrugineus b other; queens eat eggs (L) 44 . Formica
Optimum curve of colony Queens in associations eat eggs (L) 34 . Lethal early queen fights observed (L) 34 . podzolica productivity with group size (L) 34 .
a F, field study; L, laboratory study. b In one field-collected association.
-either the queens selfishly limit their mass loss, and/or they influence each other's investment and condition. In S. invicta 21 and Formica podzolica 34 , competition takes the form of cofounding queens eating eggs. In very large groups, colony productivity can even drop below that of solitary queens: this has been shown to occur in a field experiment with S. invicta, where ten-queen associations were observed to produce fewer workers overall than solitary queens 21 . Results from five species in different genera (S. invicta, My. mimicus, L. niger, Messor aciculatum, F. podzolica; Table 3) suggest that a colony's overall worker production reaches a maximum at intermediate queen numbers and declines in larger groups. This suggests that once a given worker brood is produced, queens parasitize their nestmates' investment, often by eating their eggs.
In associations of S. invicta, the queen that loses the least mass is the most likely to survive 23, 24 , as would be predicted if losing less mass in the presence of other queens, and maintaining a better condition than the cofoundresses, grants a direct benefit in fights 33 . Similar results have been obtained for L. pallitarsis 32 . This correlation might also arise indirectly if fighting ability is not determined by relative body mass at the time of fights, but by some other phenotypic trait (e.g. size) that affects both the outcome of fights and the ability of queens to influence how much they each invest in worker production. Evidence for S. invicta is consistent with this hypothesis. Experimental manipulations of queen investment through differential feeding and exposure to different social environments do not result in an increased survival probability of the queen having lost least mass, indicating that differential mass loss does not directly affect the outcome of fights 9 . Instead, the relative and combined mass loss of cofoundresses reflects physical size differences between them, measured as head width 9 . The greater the size difference between queens, the less mass the larger queen loses and the lower the combined mass loss of both queens 9 . Larger queens are also more likely to win the fights 9 . This lower mass loss by the larger queen is probably the selfish response of a better competitor in the presence of a cofoundress. Indeed, for solitary queens there is no significant correlation between physical size and mass loss 9 .
The queen within a group that loses least mass should have a smaller share of maternity among workers, especially if nestmate queens are of the same initial mass, because queens draw on their body reserves to produce workers. Paradoxically, genetic analysis 25 of the first worker-brood in S. invicta two-queen colonies, in which initial queen mass was controlled, revealed that the queen losing least mass (and the most likely to survive) had a significantly larger share of maternity among larval and adult workers. This pattern is consistent with the ability of the queens to affect each other's condition and investment through differences in their competitiveness. Either the queen who is the stronger competitor is able to contribute disproportionately to viable eggs that become workers, or the poorer competitor regurgitates more or contributes disproportionately to the trophic eggs.
The relative phenotype of cofoundresses thus modifies the extent of cooperative benefits of foundress associations. The association between relative fighting ability and the extent of cooperative investment (estimated as queen mass loss) 9, 25 , with the ensuing costs to colony productivity, reveals selfish interactions in spite of the apparent peacefulness of queen behaviors before worker eclosion 8, 13 . These peaceful interactions range from grooming to occasional food exchange [e.g. P. moesta, Lasius flavus, Camponotus vicinius, Iridomyrmex purpureus 7 and S. invicta (E. Vargo, pers. commun.) 9 ] and the contribution of all queens to egg laying and brood care ( Table 2 ). The occurrence of early conflicts and the possibility that queen-queen competition regulates individual contribution to costly tasks ( Table 3 ), suggest that group selection need not be invoked to account for the apparently altruistic behavior of unrelated ant cofoundresses (see Ref. 9 for references).
Do workers influence the outcome of queen fights?
When adult workers emerge, aggression among queens intensifies and escalates to fatal fights 10, 15 . Because workers are present when queens fight, the workers might influence which queen survives. In cooperative associations, workers might be expected to favor their mother over unrelated queens; however, there is little evidence that workers attack queens. In S. invicta, queen fights are conspicuous, although sometimes workers have been observed to attack already injured queens 9, 23, 24 , and queens that had been experimentally prevented access to the brood pile 24 . Genetic analyses of two-queen colonies have revealed that in most colonies the survivor is the mother of most of the workers 25 . This result does not necessarily imply that workers affect the outcome of fights because of the previously discussed correlation between maternity shares, mass loss and fighting ability. In another study, with a smaller sample size and initial mass differences between cofoundresses, there was no significant association between maternity and queen survival 24 , and manipulating the queens' share of maternity among the worker brood in S. invicta did not affect queen survival significantly 23, 24 . In My. mimicus, worker aggression could also be directed against queens that have injured themselves in fights 14 .
Even in the absence of within-colony kin recognition, it is possible that workers might attempt to bias the outcome of queen competition, for instance, by favoring the most fecund queen 36 . Laboratory studies of L. niger reveal that queens differ significantly in egg-laying rates and that workers preferentially feed the queens with the higher egglaying rates 15 . This suggests that queens that maintain good condition up until worker emergence might signal their fecundity to workers 9 .
Conclusions
Grouping can be favored even among unrelated individuals if, by joining, a group member achieves higher fitness than she could have as a solitary female, and if the final jackpot winner cannot be entirely predicted when the group forms. As long as group members are needed, conflict is mild and hard to detect, but it becomes overt as group members jockey for the best position in the final fights. As soon as the presence of other group members is no longer advantageous, the group falls apart as members fight to the death for sole control. Workers appear to have a little role in these conflicts, possibly because of the lack of within-colony kin discrimination. Important directions for future work include extending experiments conducted on fire ants to other species. There are gaps in at least three areas. First, we need data on the process of group formation and nestmate choice under field conditions. Second, we need detailed behavioral and physiological analyses of how the cooperating, and at the same time competing, queens allocate their resources to parental investment (worker production and care), to clarify further the potential trade-off between individual-and colony-level investment optima. Third, we need to know whether queens can monitor, or even influence, each other's contribution to cooperative benefits. Together with the available evidence, filling these gaps should soon allow, for the first time, a synthesis of costs and benefits at the individual and colony level in a cooperative system.
